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Abstract:  The goal of the present paper is a short analysis for the insurers’ foreign equity in Romania and 
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insurers’ equity from the point of view of assessing the insolvency probabilities and the risk provision so 
the estimating insolvency risk will not over overcome an accepted value.  
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Introduction 
Since 1989, Romania faced a development of private property and a concentration of indigene capital, facts 
that  determined  continuous  growth  of  the  insurance  market.  In  a  first  phase,  the  permissible  legal 
framework (Law no. 47/1991) and the lack of the Romanian capital but also the attractiveness of the 
Romanian market were the main factors for the market penetration of the foreign capital on the Romanian 
insurance market. The same phenomenon took place in the insurance mediation sector. 
The number of insurers reached a normal evolution, with a spectacular growth at the beginning of the 
insurance market, followed by a decrease according to the concentration and centralization of the capital, 
as shown below: (P is the percent of foreign capital to equity of the insurers).  
Year  Number of insurers  P % 
1997      47  - 
1998      64  - 
1999      72  62,11 
2000      73  75,80 
2001      47  61,70 
2002      48  50,20 
2003      44  59,21 
2004      45  48,00 
2005      43  50,00 
2006      41  53,10 
Source: - OSAAR Reports, Bucharest, years 1997-1999; 
- ISC Reports, Bucharest, years 2000-2006; 
As it can be seen, a significant share of equity is represented by the foreign capital, mainly Austrian or 
German. Since year 2007, it is evident a foreign capital domination due to the fact that the first 6 insurers 
have a market share of more than 70%.  Since year 2000, there are changes in the sales management for the 
insurance products, so the insurance agent is replaced by the insurance broker. The law 32/2000 sets a 
clearer view on mediation sector, especially for brokers. This is supposed to be a legal person, to prove   211 
cash equity, to have valid third party liability insurance, and the only subject of activity – the insurance 
mediation, to have qualified human resources.      
The evolution for the number of brokers is shown below: 




749  817  198  150  204  266  317  344 
Source: O.S.A.A.R. and ISC Reports, Bucharest, years 1999-2006. 
It is important to assess the risk that an insurance company faces bankruptcy. In order to explain this, we 
shall  provide  a  mathematical  model  regarding  the  insurer’s  capital  and  we  shall  determine  the  ruin 
probability,  this  means  the  probability  that  the  insurer  has  no  more  resources  to  pay  the  indemnities 
(obviously this isn’t a de facto ruin, but an attention for the financial management).  
2. The modeling of risk of ruin 
In order to study the variation of insurer’s equity, we shall note with U(t) the insurer’s equity at moment t, 
with  u  the  initial  capital,  with  S(t)  the  total  claim  demand  (more  precisely  the  amount  of  total  claim 
demand) occurred till the moment t, with m the number of insurance policies, with  ( ) k N t  the number of 
individual claim demands till the moment t for a given policy type k, with 
k
i Y  the individual demand 
number i for the insurance type k  and with  ( ) k S t  the claim demand occurred till the moment t for a 
given policy type k. 
We have: 
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Additionally, we presume the following hypothesis to be fulfilled: 
1.  there are no other expenses than the paid indemnities and no other incomes than the cashed 
premiums. 
2.  the unit income is c. 
3.  the individual claim demands for every policy type are independent identically distributed 
random variables. The individual claim demands for every insurance type are independent 
and identically distributed variables  
4.  the  stochastic  processes ( ) ( ) , 1, k t N t k m = ,  for  the  number  of  demands  are  Poisson 
processes  of  parameter k λ .  It  results  that  process  {S(t)}t  is  a  compound  Poisson  process 















= ￿ , where random variables 
i X  are independent and identically distributed, having the moment of order k noted with mk, 
( )
k
k m M X = .  The  variables  i X   equalize  mathematically  the  individual  real  claim 
demands 
k
i Y ,  but  there  are  not  identically  distributed.  In  these  hypothesis,  we  have 
1 ( ( ))    M S t t m λ = ⋅ ⋅  and 
2
2 ( ( ))    · ·   D S t t m λ = .  
5.  The insurance premiums are determined with respect to the medium value principle, with an 
overcharging relative confidence ￿:  
k 1  = (1 +  ) ·    ( (1)) c m M N θ ⋅ .   212
We have:                 ( ) ( ) U t u c t S t = + ⋅ −                                            (1).  
We shall name ruin the situation this capital is negative and we shall consider the moment of ruin at the 
moment  this  happen  for  the  first  time.  So  we  are  dealing  with  the  problem  of  ruin  for  a  given, 
undetermined period of time, called finite horizon. So:  
 = inf{  > 0 ( ) < 0} T t U t  is the moment of ruin. 
In this context, the ruin probability (noted withΨ ) is the probability that the moment of ruin is finite. 
From the point of view of initial capital u, the overcharging factorθ , the claim files rate  λ  and the 
medium individual claim demand 1 m , the function is:  1 ( , , , )    (      ). u m P T θ λ Ψ = < ∞  
The equation (in r) strictly positive solution: ( )  +   =  ·
r X c r M e λ λ
⋅ ⋅  is called adjustment coefficient. 
This coefficient (when does exist) shall be noted as R.  
Considering an existing adjustment coefficient R, we have:  






− ⋅ ψ =
< ∞
. 
If the adjustment coefficient R does exist, then  ( )
R u u e
− ⋅ Ψ ≤  (this is known as the Cramer inequality). 
This  is  determined  by  the  fact  that  for  a  finite  T  (T  <  ∞),  we  have  U(T)  <  0,  so 
( ) ( )  > 1. 
RU T M e T
− ⋅ <∞  
Generally speaking, because the adjustment coefficient is difficult to compute, we seek for a convenient 
interval, whose margins are used in the Cramer inequality. Because  ( )
R X M e











< .  Considering the function ￿(r) = ￿·(mX(r) − 1) − c·r which is strictly convex and 
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⋅ +
                    (2). 













     (3). 
We could improve this model by setting the problem to compute a risk provision (V), in order to define the 
probability that paid indemnities should not overcome the incomes plus this provision, under an accepted 
value p. If the medium number of claim demands (in our case  n t λ = ⋅ ) is big enough, we can use the 
central  limit  theorem  (TLC)  and  approximate  ( ) S t   with  a  normal  variable  of  mean  1 t m λ ⋅ ⋅   and 
dispersion  2 t m λ⋅ ⋅ . So we want to determine V in order that  ( ) ( ) P S t u c t V p ≥ + ⋅ + ≤ . Using TLC   213 
we obtain  1 2 1 p V z t m u t m λ θ λ − ≥ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , where  1 p z −  is the quartile  of order 1 p −  of the 
normal repartition. If we choose the minimum risk reserve in order not to block higher financial resources, 
we have:  
1 2 1        (4) p V z t m u t m λ θ λ − = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  









= , we have:  







= ⋅ − −  
 
  Choosing an initial equity to represent a number of individual medium claim demands (β  
), we obtain:  
1              (6)
p z t t
V
λ β θ λ
α
− ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅
=  
3. Numerical results 
From relation (3)  we  have determined the  values  for ruin probabilities for a few  values of premiums 
overcharging factor θ  and parameterβ , that provide the number of medium individual demands to cover 
the initial equity. 
The results are listed in the table below: 
\ θ β     5    10    20    30     50     60    100 
0.1  0.5770  0.3663  0.1476  0.05945  0.00965  0.00428  0.0001 
0.2  0.3622  0.1574  0.0297  0.0056  0.0002  5 4.5 10
− ⋅  
8 4.8 10
− ⋅  
0.4  0.1712  0.0410  0.0024  0.00014  7 4.5 10
− ⋅  
8 3.6 10
− ⋅  
13 2.8 10
− ⋅  
0.6  0.0958  0.0147  0.0003  6 8.1 10
− ⋅  
9 4.5 10
− ⋅  
10 1.7 10
− ⋅  
17 3.2 10
− ⋅  
Obviously, the higher the initial equity and the bigger the overcharging premiums are, the smaller the ruin 
probability is. The diminution of risk of ruin realizes exponentially compared to the growth of those two 
factors. The increasing overcharging factor is limited by the necessity to maintain an adequate premium 
level  for  the  competitiveness  of  the  insurance  company  on  market.  We  also  emphasize  this  model  is 
correlating to strong the incomes and the indemnities, the medium income per unit time being proportional 
to the medium number of individual claim demands multiplied by the value of medium individual claim 
demand.  
This is due  to the principle  of  medium value  for the premiums computation. We consider the  use of 
medium annual claim index instead of claim demand in order to obtain a more realistic model. 
Using relation (6) we obtained the following results: 
−  for  0.005, 0.001, 1, 2 p α λ β = = = = , values of t and  β , the risk reserve V ( u.m.) is 
provided in the following tabel: 
\ t θ     0.1    0.2    0.5 
1    480    380     80 
5  3269  2769  1269   214
10  5159  4159  1159 
−  for  0.001, 0.01, 5, 0.1 p α λ θ = = = = , values of t and β , the risk reserve V ( u.m.) is 
provided in the following tabel: 
\ t β      5    10   20 
100  1590  1090    90 
400  1680  1180  180 
We underline that the negative values for the relations (4)-(6) mean a risk reserve equal to zero. We also 
ascertain the risk reserve to be proportional to the claim medium individual demand, decreasing when the 
initial equity covers many claim individual demands and decreasing when the requested margin for the 
insolvency risk decreases. 
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